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I. The Court Erred in Setting Aside the Confession for Lack of Verification. 
The trial court erred when it ruled that the Confession of Judgment (the 
"Confession") "lack[ ed] the necessary verification" because (1) Munday cannot avoid his 
obligations based on his own failures; (2) Rule 58A(i) does not require verification to be 
under oath, and (3) the Confession was verified under oath. 
A. Munday Cannot Avoid the Confession Based On an Alleged Failure to 
Properly Verify the Agreement He Undisputedly Entered. 
Munday cannot avoid the judgment based on an argument of inadequate 
verification. "[T]he historically accepted rule" is that "a debtor cannot avoid an otherwise 
valid signed confession based on his failure to verify the statements he subscribed." Coast 
to Coast Demolition & Crushing, Inc. v. Real Equity Pursuit, LLC, 226 P.3d 605, 609 (Nev. 
2010) see also Los Angeles Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Noonan, 181 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 
834, 839 (1960) ("A verification is seldom for the benefit of the one who verifies but is for 
the purpose of discouraging the individual from uttering false statements, such as in 
pleadings and criminal complaints. The omitted requirement was never intended for 
respondent's benefit. The important consideration for this court is whether or not the 
confession was in fact signed by the respondent as an intended confession."). 
Safe Home made this argument in its opening brief. [See Safe Home Brief at 13-
14]. Munday completely ignored this issue on appeal. For this reason alone, the trial court's 
ruling and Munday's arguments regarding "verification" should be rejected. 
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B. Rule 58A(i) Does Not Require An "Oath and Affirmation." 
The trial court erred in relying on Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 767 P.2d 561 (Utah 
1989) to find that the judgment "lack[ ed] the necessary verification." [R.0985]. Rule 5 8A(i) 
provides that "[i]f a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party seeking the 
judgment must file with the clerk a statement, verified by the defendant .... " Utah R. Civ. 
P. 58A(i). Relying on Mickelsen the trial court interpreted the phrase "verified by the 
defendant" to require "an oath or affirmation" and "must affix a proper jurat." [ See 
R.0985]. Munday's appellate brief continues that position. Munday contends that 
Mickelsen defined what is required for a valid verification. [See Opp. at p. 10-15]. 
However, the trial court's and Munday's interpretation of Rule 58A(i) adds requirements 
to rule 58A(i) that do not exist. They do so by relying on authorities that interpreted statutes 
that required "verifiication] by the oath of[the claimant]. " See e.g. Mickelsen v. Craigco, 
Inc., 767 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1989) (interpreting statutory mechanics' lien requirement 
that a mechanic's lien "must be verified by the oath of [the claimant]" (emphasis added)); 
Worthington & Kimball Const. Co. v. C & A Dev. Co., 777 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989) 
(same); First Sec. Mortg. Co. v. Hansen, 631 P.2d 919, 920 (Utah 1981) (same). 
In Mickelsen, the court addressed the statutory requirement that a mechanic's lien 
be "verified by the oath of [the claimant] or some other person." Id; see also Utah Code 
section 38-1-7 (1974 ). The appellant argued that the appellee's notice oflien "was invalid" 
because the claimant had not sworn an oath. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held the oath 
requirement did "not require that the affiant raise his hand or speak any words in order to 
have a valid verification," but rather that "verified by the oath" required (1) a correct written 
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oath or affirmation, that (2) is signed by the affiant in the presence of a notary or other 
person authorized to take oaths, and (3) the latter must affix a proper jurat. Id. at 563-64. 
Similar language was at issue in Worthington & Kimball Const. Co. v. C & A Dev. 
Co., 777 P .2d 4 7 5 (Utah 1989). Again, the plaintiff in that case appealed after the trial ruled 
that a mechanic's lien was not "verified by [an] oath." Id. at 4 7 6-77. In response, the court 
simply referred to the Mickelsen case, which had been decided only six months prior. Id. 
Unlike the mechanic ' s lien statute at issue in Mickelsen and Worthington , Rule 
58A(i) does not require a "verification by oath." All that is required is that it the statement 
be "verified by the defendant." See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(i). This is a notable change from 
both the historical mechanics' lien act and from other Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For 
example, Rule 33(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require a party responding to 
interrogatories to answer in "writing under oath or affirmation." Rule 83(d)(l)(C) requires 
vexatious litigants to "include an oath, affirmation or declaration under criminal penalty 
that the proposed paper .. . is not filed for" vexatious purposes. Rule 30 requires a deponent 
to be administered an "oath or affirmation" before being deposed. 
When interpreting a statute or rule, Utah courts should "assume . . . that the 
legislature used each term advisedly according to its ordinary and usually accepted 
meaning" and "presume that the expression of one term should be interpreted as the 
exclusion of another." Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P'ship, 2011 UT 50, ,r 14, 267 
P.3d 863. Courts, therefore "give effect to omissions in statutory language by presuming 
all omissions to be purposeful." Id.; see also Arbogast Family Tr. v. River Crossings, LLC, 
2010 UT 40, ,r 18, 238 P.3d 1038 ("When we interpret a procedural rule, we do so 
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according to our general rules of statutory construction."); Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, 
,r 19, 133 P.3d 370 ("We interpret court rules, like statutes and administrative rules .... "). 
Unlike other statutes and rules, Rule 58A(i) does not require verification by the oath or 
affirmation of the defendant. See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(i). Rule 58A(i)'s exclusion of "oath 
and affirmation," is presumed purposeful and should be given meaning. This can only be 
accomplished by giving Rule 58A's requirement for a "statement verified by the 
defendant" a different meaning than the statutes that required a petition to be "verified by 
the oath of [the claimant]." See, e.g. , Utah Code section 38- 1-7 (1974). The trial court' s 
reliance on authority that interpreted a statute that required verification by an oath was an 
error because Rule 5 8A does not impose any requirement for verification by oath. 
Additionally, "verified " cannot be interpreted to have the same meaning as "verified 
by oath," as Munday contends, because it renders the suffix "by oath" superfluous. See 
Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc. , 2001 UT 29, ,r 13, 24 P.3d 928 (Utah 2001) (When 
interpreting a statute, courts have a "fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every 
word of the statute."). Thus, in the context of Rule 58A, the word "verified" is to be given 
its ordinary meaning or usually accepted interpretation and cannot have the same meaning 
as "verified by oath." Arbogast Family Tr., 2010 UT 40, ,r 18 (When interpreting a rule of 
civil procedure, a court should "start by examining the ordinary meaning or usually 
accepted interpretation."). 
The ordinary meaning of "verified" is "to make certain that something is correct." 
See, e.g. Cambridge Dictionary, 
https :// dictionary cambridge. org/us/ dictionarvl engl is hive rifled (last visited January 15, 
4 
2019). Thus, in order for a statement to be verified by the defendant under Rule 58A, a 
defendant must confirm the accuracy of a statement for confession of judgment. This 
meaning is consistent with other rules and statutes that require something to be "verified" 
(as opposed to "verified by oath"). See Aequitas Enterprises, LLC v. Interstate Inv. Grp., 
LLC, 2011 UT 82, ifl 7, 267 P.3d 923 ("[Party's] attempt to interpret one rule by drawing 
on other rules is well taken."). For example, Rule 26.l(c)(l) and (5) require each party in 
a domestic dispute to submit "copies of statements verifying the amounts listed on the 
Financial Declaration" and "[ d]ocuments verifying the value of all real estate." Likewise, 
Utah Code section 11-42-205 requires an appraisal before a local entity can designate an 
assessment area in order to "verify[] that the market value of the property, ... , is at least 
three times the amount of the assessments proposed to be levied against the unimproved 
property." 
Utah Code section 20A-7-505 requires a sponsor of an initiative petition to "verify 
each signature sheet by completing the verification ... on the last page of each initiative 
packet." Utah Code section 20A-7-503(3) defines what is required to "verify" the 
signatures, which amount to confirming that "all the names that appear in th[ e] initiative 
packet were signed by the individuals," and confirming that names, addresses are correct, 
and each signer is registered to vote in Utah or intends to become registered to vote. Id. 
Notable, "verification" does not require an oath or affirmation, notarization, or jurat. 
It is also consistent with the ordinary meaning of the word. See State v. Martinez-
Castellanos, 2018 UT 46, ,r 6, 428 P .3d 103 8 ("The trooper verified that the car was indeed 
registered and that Mr. Martinez-Castellanos had a valid Utah Driver license."); State v. 
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Speed, 2017 UT App 76, ,r 27, 397 P.3d 824 ("At the beginning of the hearing, the 
court verified that both parties had reviewed the PSI.") 
Here, Munday "verified" the Confession, by s1gnmg the Confession's 
acknowledgement, which stated that Munday "hereby authorizes and consents to the entry 
of Judgment by Confession against him ... in the principal amount of $160,000" and 
"stipulate[d] that the Judgment in the f01m attached may be entered against [him] in favor 
of plaintiff in that specified sum as defined [there Jin." [R.002]. Simply put, Munday 
"verified" the statement by signing his name; confirming the statements contained therein 
were correct and accurate. There is no dispute that Munday signed the confession; he 
conceded as much to the trial court. [R.0005]. And the trial court acknowledged as much 
in its ruling. [See R.0984 ("Munday signed a Judgment by Confession")]. Accordingly, 
Munday "verified" the accuracy of the statement by signing it. 
C. The Confession Meets the Mickelson Requirements. 
Even if Rule 58A required an "oath and affirmation" and the elements described in 
Mickelson therefore applied, the Confession still is sufficient because the jurat "subscribed 
and sworn to before me" meets the Mickelson requirements. See White v. Heber City, 26 
P.2d 333 (Utah 1933) (The "phrase or language, 'Subscribed and sworn to before me," 
fairly and reasonably means not only that the claimant subscribed the claim in the presence 
of the notary, but also that the notary administer an oath to the claimant, and that he [,] 
under oath in substance and effect [,] stated that the statements contained in the instrument 
or document subscribed by him were true.") . 
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Munday's attempts to distinguish White fail. Mickelson did not limit White's 
holding on this issue. Mickelson's reference to White was only to acknowledge the 
confusion in a line of cases regarding whether an "oath" required an "oral averment." See 
Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 563. Further Mickelson only overruled Worthington & Kimball 
Const. Co., 777 P.2d 475, Spangler v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 104 Utah 584, 
140 P.2d 775 (1943) and Colman v. Schwendiman, 680 P.2d 29 (Utah 1984) "to the extent 
that they conflict with th[ e] new rule" that "[t]here is no minimum requirement that an oath 
must be administered to the affiant or that the affiant must speak an oral oath or affirmation 
or raise his or her hand." Mickelson, 767 P.2d at 564. In other words, Mickelson allowed 
an "oath" to be given through writing, but it did not disallow the administration of an oral 
oath. 
Thus, White's holding that the jurat "subscribed and sworn to before me" is 
sufficient to establish that a statement is sworn to under an oath is still good law. See also 
In re Williamson, 43 BR. 813, 823 (Banla. D. Utah 1984) ("The first phrase of the jurat is 
' subscribed and sworn to before me .. .' The purpose of this language is to certify that the 
person making the foregoing acknowledgment did, in fact, appear before the official and 
did subscribe to the acknowledgement and oath ... In other words, it is to certify that the 
signatory voluntarily signed ... in the presence of the certifying official under penalty of 
perjury."). 
II. The Court Erred in Finding the Confession Lacked a Proper Jurat. 
Munday incorrectly contends that Safe Home has failed to address the trial court's 
findings relating to an inadequate jurat. As discussed above, the requirement of a proper 
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jurat is based on the trial court's reliance on Mickelsen. This was an error, and there is no 
jurat requirement under Rule 58A(i). 
However, even if Mickelsen and its requirements for ajurat applied, the jurat at issue 
is sufficient under the Notaries Public Reform Act and the trial court's finding that the 
Confession "lack[ ed] a proper jurat," was also an error. Safe Home addressed this error in 
its opening brief. [See Safe Home Brief at 13]. 
In reaching its conclusion that the jurat was deficient, the trial court relied on Utah 
Code section 46-l-2-(5)'s definition of''jurat" to determine that a proper jurat must contain 
a "written oath or affirmation," an "indication that the statement was voluntarily signed," 
and an "indication that the signer of the document produced evidence of his identity." 
[R.0985]. The trial court then held that the jurat "Subscribed and Sworn to" did not meet 
those requirements. [R.0985]. The trial court's ruling is in error. 
Although the trial court cited Utah Code section 46-1-2, it ignored section 46-1-6.5. 
Section 46-1-6.5(2)(b) declares that "[a]n affidavit for a jurat that is in substantially the 
following fonn is sufficient." Utah Code Ann. § 46-l-6.5(2)(b). The code then identifies 
the essential information to include the language "[ s ]ubcribed and sworn to before me" 
with the date, name of the notary, and name of the document signer. Id. That information 
is present in this case. [See R.0001-02]. The Confession contains the critical "subscribed 
and sworn to before me" language, the date, the name of the notary, and Munday's 
signature. [Id.]. Thus, the jurat at issue "substantially" followed the Utah Code and "is 
sufficient for the completion of a notarization." Id. §46-1-6.5(1 ); see also White, 26 P .2d 
8 
at 335; In re Williamson, 43 BR. at 823. For these reasons, Munday's arguments that the 
Confession is inadequate because it lacks a proper jurat fail. 
III. The Confession Contained a "Specified Sum." 
The trial court' s ruling regarding "specified sum" was also an error for at least two 
reasons . First, Munday's specifically acknowledged that the signing bonus of $160,000 
"constituted a 'specified sum' within the scope of Rule 58A([i])." [R.0002]. Second, the 
trial court's requirement for a "final specified amount," ignores the plain meaning of 
"specified sum." [R.0986]. 
A. Munday's Arguments Ignore the Facts of the Case and His Own 
Agreement. 
Munday's arguments about there being no "specified sum" ignore the realities of 
this case. As part of his negotiated contract with Safe Home, Munday voluntarily accepted 
a $160,000 signing bonus. [R.0013]. Safe Home required that "prior to receiving the 
Signing Bonus, [Munday] must sign the consent to judgment." [R.0013]. Munday 
voluntarily did so and then took the $160,000. [See R.001]. 
Not surprisingly, Munday's Confession expressly consented "to the entry of 
Judgment by Confession against him or her in the principal amount of$160,000." [R.001]. 
That amount further was defined as the "Judgment Amount." [Id.]. Munday "expressly 
stipulate[d] and agree[d] that the sum that is specified as the Judgment Amount shall be 
deemed to be 'justly due' and shall be deemed to constitute a 'specified sum' within the 
scope of Rule 58A(f) [sic] of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. [Munday] further 
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stipulates that the Judgment in the form attached may be entered against him in favor of 
plaintiff in that specified sum as defined herein." [R.002 (emphasis added)]. 
Munday breached his contractual obligations by failing to repay the $160,000. 
Accordingly, Safe Home filed the Confession. When it did so, it did not try to vary the 
amount that was owed. Rather, Safe Home requested - and still requests - the defined and 
stipulated Judgment Amount. It requested - and still requests - a judgment in the amount 
of $160,000. That stipulated, specified sum never changed. Safe Home has only ever 
requested a judgment for the $160,000 Munday "expressly stipulate[ d] and agree[ d]" 
would "constitute a 'specified sum"' that "may be entered against him" as a judgment. 1 
[R.002]. As explained in Safe Home's opening brief, Munday expressly consented to that 
judgment and should not now be allowed to simultaneously keep the $160,000 he obtained 
while repudiating the terms he expressly approved in order to obtain that amount. [See Safe 
Home Brief at 19-20]. 
Finally, contrary to Munday's arguments on appeal, this issue was preserved in the 
trial court. [See, e.g., R.0829 ("Munday agreed that the Judgment would be deemed to 
comply with the rule"); R.0830 (recognizing Munday's argument "ignores the plain 
language of the Judgment itself' because Munday "expressly stipulates and agrees that the 
1 Safe Home has reserved the right to augment the judgment after it is entered to account 
for attorney fees. However, both the confession of judgment and rule 73 are clear that this 
augmentation occurs after the judgment is entered. See Utah R. Civ. P. 73(a) ("Attorney 
fees must be claimed by filing a motion for attorney fees no later than 14 days after the 
judgment is entered .... "). [See R.001 ("Judgment Amount may be augmented by any and 
all attorneys' fees and costs .... ")]. 
10 
sum that is specified as the Judgment Amount shall be deemed to be 'justly due' and shall 
be deemed to constitute a 'specified sum' within the scope of Rule 58A")]. 
B. The Confession Concisely Stated the Claim and That the Specified Sum 
Was Due. 
Even if the Court ignored that Safe Home has only ever sought the $160,000, 
Munday expressly approved as the "Judgment Amount," his arguments about the 
"specified sum" still fail. 
There is little authority interpreting rule 58A(i)'s instruction that a confession of 
judgment should state "that the specified sum is due or to become due." See Utah R. Civ. 
P. 58A(i)(l). Certainly, Munday has not identified any appellate authority from any 
jurisdiction refusing to enter a confession of judgment because the judgment allowed for 
an accounting of payments already made by the debtor or allowed for augmentation of the 
judgment to account for fees and costs. Absent such authority, this Court should look to 
the plain language of rule 58A and to comparable rules for guidance. Both favor Safe Home 
positions on appeal. 
First, the language of rule 58A supports Safe Home's arguments. Rule 58A(i) is 
written differently than how the trial court applied it. The trial court rejected the Confession 
because "[t]here was no final specified amount. " [R.0986 ( emphasis added)]. That is not 
what rule 58A actually requires . Instead, rule 58A(i) indicates that the confession should 
"concisely state the claim and that the specified sum is due or to become due." Utah R. 
Civ. P. 58A(i). In addition to adding the word ''final" to the rule, the trial court ignored the 
meaning of the word "sum." Accord. Aequitas Enterprises, 2011 UT 82, ,rl7 (recognizing 
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courts should "read the plain language" of the rules). A "sum" is the product of a 
mathematical equation. It is "the aggregate of two or more numbers, magnitudes, 
quantities, or particulars." See Dictionary. com, 
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/sum?s=t (last visited Jan. 15, 2019); see also, e.g., 
Utah Ass 'n of Credit Men v. Jones, 164 P. 1029, 1030 (Utah 1917) (affirming confession 
of judgment for "$1,100 . . . and for all costs of docketing, filing, and satisfying said 
judgment" (emphasis added)). By using the word "sum," rule 58A(i) did not preclude the 
type of calculation allowed by the Confession in this c'ase. 
Second, comparable language from other rules favor Safe Home. See generally 
Aequitas Enterprises, 2011 UT 82, i)l 7 ("[Party's] attempt to interpret one rule by drawing 
on other rules is well taken."). For example, there is no closer analogy to a confession of 
judgment than a default judgment. Indeed, "[t]he only difference between entering 
a judgment by confession and entering one upon default under such a statute is that, in the 
first instance, the defendant in proper terms expressly confesses judgment, while in the 
second he tacitly consents by his silence that judgment may be entered against him for the 
amount claimed in the complaint." Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Bowman, 113 P. 63, 67 
(1911). Not surprisingly then, rule 55 and rule 58A have similar language. Compare Utah 
R. Civ. P. 55(a) (allowing entry of judgment by the clerk for "a sum certain"); with Utah 
R. Civ. P. 58A(i) (allowing entry of judgment by the clerk for a "specified sum"). 
Importantly, although rule 55 requires "a sum certain" it also recognizes and requires the 
types of credits contemplated by the Confession before this Court. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
55(b)(l) (requiring a deduction for "credits to which the defendant is entitled"). 
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Munday does not dispute that the questioned language of rule 58A is substantially 
similar to the language in rule 55. Instead, he argues that rule 55 is implemented through a 
different procedural mechanism than rule 58A. Specifically, Munday recognizes that rule 
55(b)(l)(D) requires "a verified complaint, an affidavit, or an unsworn declaration," while 
rule 58A(i) requires a "statement verified by the defendant." See Utah R. Civ. P. 
55(b)(l)(D); id. R. 58A(i). Focusing on that difference, however, misses the mark. The 
question is not how each rule is implemented. Rather, the question is, once implemented, 
what the substantially similar language of the two rules requires. In this respect, neither 
Munday nor the trial court offered any explanation of why, for example, "a sum ce1tain" 
must deduct payments made by the defendant, but a "specified sum" cannot. See Utah R. 
Civ. P. 55(b)(l)(D); id. R. 58A(i). Indeed, both Munday and the trial court ignore that if 
confessions of judgments are not allowed to reflect payments made towards the original 
debt, it would substantially prejudice the judgment debtors. 
Munday's arguments also fail to harmonize rule 58A(i) with rules 54 and 73. 
Munday argued, and the trial court ruled, that the Confession failed because it allowed for 
augmentation of attorney fees and costs. Specifically, the trial court's ruling expressly 
relied on the fact that "[t]he amount of attorneys' fees and costs is unspecified." [R.0986] . 
Again, that ruling does not harmonize the rules of civil procedure. 
Rule 54 declares that "[t]he party who claims costs must not later than 14 days after 
the entry of judgment file and serve a verified memorandum of costs ." Utah R. Civ. P. 
54( d)(2) ( emphasis added) . Likewise, rule 73 declares that"[ a ]ttorney fees must be claimed 
by filing a motion for attorney fees no later than 14 days after the judgment is entered. " 
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Id. R.73(a) (emphasis added). Rules 54 and 73 do not exclude judgments by confession 
from their reach. Rather, those rules apply to all judgments. See Utah R. Civ. P. 54(a) 
(providing a single definition for "Judgment"). The trial court therefore erred when it 
required a calculation of costs and fees at the time the confession was executed or filed, 
rather than "14 days after the entry of judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), 73(a). 
Munday's arguments on appeal likewise fail for the same reason. 
IV. Munday's Constitutional Challenges Fail. 
Munday's constitutional challenge to Rule 58A(i) fail because he has not adequately 
briefed the issue and has not offered any argument that the Rule 58A(i) is 
unconstitutionally applied to him under the facts of this case. 
A. Munday's Facial Challenge to Rule 58A(i) is Inadequately Briefed. 
Confessions of judgment have been a part of Utah law for more than 100 years. See, 
e.g., Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Jones, 164 P. 1029, 1030-32 (Utah 1917) (finding 
confession of judgment was not improper preference of creditors). Nevertheless, Munday 
seeks to invalidate Utah law though a conclusory argument section that essentially rests on 
a single California case decided more than 40 years ago. The Court should decline to accept 
Munday's invitation to address this inadequately briefed constitutional question. 
First, Munday has failed to establish that his constitutional challenge was addressed 
in the trial court. See generally Holladay v. Storey, 2013 UT App 158, 'if34, 307 P.3d 584 
("[I]t is not the appellate court's burden to comb through the record to verify whether, and 
where, [Munday] preserved this issue, and we therefore decline to address it."). For that 
reason alone, the Court can decline review now. 
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Second, even on appeal, Munday fails to adequately explore and define the 
boundaries of his constitutional question. For example, although Munday attacks Rule 
58(A)(i), he never addresses the relevant provisions of the Utah Code. That is a glaring 
omission given the language of Rule 58(A)(i). 
Rule 58A(i) is unique. It is one of only a few rules that expressly incorporate the 
provisions of the Utah Code. Specifically, rule 58A(i) only applies when "a judgment by 
confession is authorized by statute." See Utah R. Civ. P. 58A(i) (emphasis added). Thus, 
Rule 58A(i) cannot be viewed in isolation. Rather, it must be viewed in conjunction with 
terms, limits, and protections afforded "by statute." Id. Munday offers no such analysis. 
Indeed, his brief does not even cite, let alone meaningfully discuss, any provision of the 
Utah Code that addresses confessions of judgment. He simply asks the Court to strike down 
Rule 58A(i) without fully exploring or explaining that rule. 
If Munday were offering an "as-applied" challenge, his limited analysis and briefing 
might be less meaningful. In an as-applied challenge, "a party concedes that the challenged 
[law] may be facially constitutional, but argues that under the particular facts of the party's 
case, 'the [law] was applied ... in an unconstitutional manner."' Gillmor v. Summit 
County, 2010 UT 69, i!27, 246 P.3d 102 (omission in original). That is not Munday's 
contention. Rather, Munday has asserted a facial challenge to Rule 58A(i). He does not 
contend that this case is unique, but rather that "Rule 58A(i) fails to pass constitutional 
muster." [Munday Brief at 25; accord id. at 22 ("Rule 58A(i) Is Unconstitutional")]. By 
presenting a facial challenge, Munday must show "that the [law] is so constitutionally 
flawed that no set of circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid." Id. 
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Munday cannot meet that rigorous burden without even discussing the statutory "set of 
circumstances" that are incorporated as the prerequisite to Rule 58A(i)'s application. 2 Nor 
should the Court endeavor to make Munday's arguments for him. See, e.g., State v. Sloan, 
2003 UT App 170, ,r13, 72 P.3d 138 ("An issue is inadequately briefed when the overall 
analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the 
reviewing court."). 
B. Munday's Facial Attack Fails. 
Even if the Court were to independently research and evaluate Munday's 
constitutional challenge, it still would fail. The United States Supreme Court has declared 
"that a cognovit clause is not, per se, violative of Fourteenth Amendment due process." 
D.H Overmyer Co. Inc., of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972). See generally id. 
at 176 ("The cognovit is the ancient legal device by which the debtor consents in advance 
to the holder's obtaining a judgment without notice or hearing .... "); Black's Law 
Dictionary 859 (8th Ed. 2004) (defining "cognovitjudgment" as "[a] debtor's confession 
of judgment"). In fact, the Supreme Court has affirmed the entry of a judgment by 
confession. See Overmyer, 405 U.S. at 783. 
In D.H Overmyer Co. Inc., of Ohio v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), a judgment 
was entered "without prior notice to Overmyer." Id. at 181. Only after judgment was 
2 Likewise, Munday has not even attempted to explain why invaliding the procedure for 
obtaining a judgment by confession would invalidate the statutory right or authority to 
obtain a judgment by confession. He merely assumes that if the procedures set forth in 
Rule 58A(i) were to fail, that the substantive rights granted in the Utah Code also would 
fail. His implicit conclusion is not supported by any authority. 
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entered did the clerk of the court "mail[] notices of the entry of the judgment . . . to 
Overmyer." Id. at 182. Overmyer appealed and argued that Ohio's confession of judgment 
framework was unconstitutional. The United State Supreme Court disagreed. The Court 
recognized that "[t]he due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are 
subject to waiver." Id. at 782. As a result, "a cognovit clause is not, per se, violative of 
Fourteenth Amendment due process." Id. at 187. The Court then affirmed the confession 
of judgment because the record evidence indicated that Overmyer "voluntarily, 
intelligently, and knowingly waived the rights it otherwise possessed to prejudgment notice 
and hearing." Id. at 187. 
The United State Supreme Court also decided Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) 
as a "companion to" the Overmyer matter. See Swarb, 405 U.S. at 193. The United States 
Supreme Court described the confession of judgment procedures as follows: 
It is apparent, therefore, that in Pennsylvania confession-of-judgment 
provisions are given full procedural effect; that the plaintiffs attorney 
himself may effectuate the entire procedure; that the prothonotary, a 
nonjudicial officer, is the official utilized; that notice issues after the 
judgment is entered; and that execution upon the confessed judgment may be 
taken forthwith. The defendant may seek relief by way of a petition to strike 
the judgment or to open it, but he must assert prima facie grounds for this 
relief, and he achieves a trial only if he persuades the court to open. 
Meanwhile, the judgment and its lien remain. 
Id. at 195. The plaintiffs in Swarb appealed and argued "that the court should have declared 
the Pennsylvania rules and statutes unconstitutional on their face." Id. The Supreme Court 
disagreed. The Court recognized that the Overmyer opinion prevented a facial 
unconstitutional argument. Id. at 200. The Court explained that "[i]n Overmyer it is 
recognized . . . that, under appropriate circumstances, a cognovit debtor may be held 
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effectively and legally to have waived those rights he would possess if the document he 
signed had contained no cognovit provision." Id. at 200. As such, the Supreme Court again 
rejected a facial attack to a confession of judgment statute. Id.; see also id. at 202 
("Problems of this kind are peculiarly appropriate grist for the legislative mill."). 3 
Other courts have ruled similarly. See, e.g., FDIC v. Aaronian, 93 F.3d 636, 640 
(9th Cir. 1996) ("Cognovit notes serve a valuable commercial purpose by interjecting a 
measure of security for the creditor into the lending relationship" and "are not 
unconstitutional per se"); Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 509 F .2d 511, 515 
(D.C. Cir. 1974) ("Overmyer and Swarb ... clearly dispose of appellants' facial 
constitutional challenge."); Gifford v. Casper Neon Sign Co., 618 P.2d 547, 550 (Wyo. 
1980) ("[D]eclining to hold cognovit judgments facially invalid"). 
"Because the procedure is not invalid per se, a debtor must allege with some 
specificity facts tending to show a constitutional defect in the application of this procedure 
to him .... " Aaronian, 93 F.3d at 640. In other words, Munday should have made an as-
applied constitutional challenge. But he did not. Munday's argument on this issue does not 
contain even a single cite to the record in this unique case. Nor does that record support his 
3 Munday's argument entirely ignores the binding precedent from the United State 
Supreme Court. Instead, Munday calls a split-decision case from California "the lead 
case." [See Munday Brief at 22 (citing Isbell v. County of Sonoma, 21 Cal. 3d 61 (1978))]. 
In so doing, Munday entirely ignores the strong rebuke contained in the dissent. See Isbell, 
21 Cal. 3d 76 (Richardson J., dissenting) ("The majority's holding of facial 
unconstitutionality conflicts with the latest expressions of the United State Supreme Court 
on the subject .... "). This Court should not tum to questionable authority from California 
to address an issue of federal constitutional law already decided by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
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cause. To the contrary, the record reveals that Munday had substantial experience in the 
relevant industry and previously had signed similar confessions when he received advances 
from prior employers. [See, e.g. R.921 -24]. At the time of execution Munday himself 
indicated, "I've done these things a lot. I know what all these things are." [R.890]. Further, 
Munday received specific consideration in connection with the confession - a $160,000 
Signing Bonus. [See R.0013]. This was not an adhesion contract. While the contract 
required that "prior to receiving the Signing Bonus, [Munday] must sign the consent to 
judgment," nobody forced Munday to accept the $160,000 Signing Bonus. [Id.]. Rather, 
Munday freely chose to execute the confession - as he had throughout his career - and then 
pocketed the $160,000 that followed. He cannot now properly complain about contract 
terms he freely entered to obtain a benefit he negotiated and kept. 
V. Munday is Not Entitled to Attorney Fees. 
Because the trial court erred in its ruling, it also erred in awarding Munday his 
attorney fees as the prevailing party under Utah Code Section 78B-5-826. But even if the 
trial court' s ruling on the confession is upheld, its ruling allowing fees was still flawed 
because the enforcement of the confession was not a "civil action." 
Utah Code 78B-5-826 allows a party to collect attorney fees "that prevails in a civil 
action. " The issue is one of statutory interpretation and the meaning of "civil action." 
"[U]nless a statute is ambiguous," Utah Courts "look exclusively to a statute's plain 
language to ascertain the statute's meaning." Prince v. Bear River Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 
68, ,r 21, 56 P.3d 524. The meaning should be "in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters." State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, ,r 16, 137 P.3d 726. "Where the 
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legislature includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another it 
is generally presumed that the legislature acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate 
inclusion or exclusion." Alliant Techsyste,ns, Inc. v. Salt Lake Bd. of Equalization, 2012 
UT 4, ,r 23 n.27, 270 P.3d 44 quoting Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010). For 
this reason, "different words used m similar statutes are presumed to have 
different meanings." Outfront Media, LLC v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2017 UT 74, ,r 28, 416 
P.3d 389. 
The trial court' s interpretation of"civil action" under Utah Code 78B-5-826 violates 
these rules of statutory interpretation and is contrary to this Court ' s rulings in Thorpe v. 
Washington City, 2010 UT App. 297, 243 P.3d 500, and Brigham Young University v. 
Tremco Consultants, Inc. , 2007 UT 17, 156 P.3d 782. The trial court and Munday both 
define "civil action" to have the same meaning as "civil proceeding" i.e. "an expansive 
interpretation [that] include[s] all proceedings before a civil court within the state." [Opp. 
at p. 27]; see also Black's Law Dictionary, 1324 (9th ed. 2009) ("[a proceeding] is more 
comprehensive than the word 'action"'). 
But different words used in similar statutes are presumed to have different 
meanings, and the use of particular language in one section of a statute that is omitted in 
another is presumed intentional. See Outfront Media, LLC, 2017 UT 74, ,r 28. Part 8 in 
Chapter 5 of Title 78B uses different wording in referencing filings or proceedings having 
a civil character. For example, section 78B-5-805 applies to "any civil action or 
proceeding." Section 78B-5-813 applies to "any civil proceeding." The rules of statutory 
interpretation presume "civil action" and "civil proceeding" have different meanings and 
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the use of one while excluding the other is presumed intentional. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 
2012 UT 4, iJ 23 n.27. 
"Civil proceeding" has a broader meanmg "civil action." See Black's Law 
Dictionary, 1324 (9th ed. 2009) ("[a proceeding] is more comprehensive than the word 
'action"'). A "civil proceeding" is a phrase commonly used to refer to the business done in 
courts. See id. Several courts have addressed this issue and come to the same conclusion. 
See Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Prof. Agency, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 
1063 (N.D. Cal. 2018) ("The term [proceeding] is more comprehensive than the word 
'action."); Mount v. Apao, 139 Haw. 167, 176 (2016) (same); Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins. 
Co., 285 P.3d 328, 334 (Colo. App. 2012) (same); Heltsley v. Frogge, 350 S.W.3d 807, 
809 (Ky. Ct. App. 201 l)(same); Dever v. Lucas, 174 Ohio App. 3d 725, 731 (2008) (same); 
Karellas v. Karellas, 61 Mass. App. Ct. 716, 723 (2004) (same). 
While "civil proceeding" is broad and refers to the business done in courts, this 
Court has recognized the phrase "civil action" "is a term of art, and a rather precise one at 
that." Thorpe v. Washington City, 2010 UT App. 297, iJ 15, 243 P.3d 500. In Thorpe this 
Court held "civil action" "does not expansively include any and all filings having a civil 
character." Instead, the Court defined the term as follows: "A civil action is commenced 
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together with a 
copy of the complaint." Id. Munday offers little to distinguish Thorpe v. Washington City, 
2010 UT App. 297, 243 P .3d 500. While the Thorpe Court was addressing a notice of claim 
under the Governmental Immunity Act this does not alter the Cami's analysis on the 
meaning "civil action." 
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This meaning for "Civil Action" is consistent with how the phrase is used in Part 8 
of Chapter 5 in Title 78B. There, the legislature used both "civil proceeding" and "civil 
action." If the legislature intended Utah Code section 78B-5-826 to apply "all proceedings 
before a civil court within the state," as Munday argues, it would have used the broader 
"civil proceeding," as it did in Utah Code section 78B-5-813, or both "civil proceeding" 
and "civil action," as it did in Utah Code section 78B-5-805. But it did not. The legislature 
limited Utah Code 78B-5-813 to "civil actions" only. The legislature's exclusion of 
"proceeding" from the statute ' s application should be given effect. 
The trial court acknowledged that the Confession did not fit into this definition, as 
a complaint and service of a summons "was not done here." [R.1081]. The trial court 
nevertheless reasoned that while the proceeding was not commenced with a complaint or 
service of a summons, "that [ did] not change the fact that a confession of judgment [] is a 
civil judgment which is subject to collection pursuant to civil procedural rules." [Id. 
(emphasis in original)]. However, it was this same reasoning that the Utah Supreme Court 
expressly rejected in Tremco, 2007 UT 17. 
The Tremco court recognized that just because a proceeding is civil in nature or is 
governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, does mean that the proceeding is a "civil action." 
See id. at ,i 46-4 7. The Tremco court also defined "civil action" as a proceeding "that must 
be prosecuted in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, commencing 
with the filing of a summons and complaint and not the abbreviated post-judgment 
collection procedures of rule 69." See also McBride- Williams v. Huard, 2004 UT 21 , 94 
P.3d 175 (stating that a civil action is commenced under rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure by filing a complaint with the court or by serving a summons on the defendant 
with a copy of the complaint). 
Munday's policy argument also fails because there was not an unequal exposure to 
the risk of contractual liability for attorney fees as it relates to obtaining the judgment itself. 
See Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp. , 2009 UT 2, il 77, 201 P.3d 966. The Confession 
only allows for attorney fees in collecting on the judgment once it was entered. The 
Confession states that Munday "agrees that the Judgment and Judgment Amount may be 
augmented by any and all attorney fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff in collecting on the 
Judgment or collecting the Judgment Amount." [R.001]. The parties' agreement did not 
allow Safe Home its attorney fees incurred in seeking to obtain the judgment. Nor does it 
allow Munday his fees in resisting Safe Home's efforts to obtain the judgment. Thus, even 
if the Confession constituted a "civil action" under Utah Code section 78B-5-805 (which 
it does not), the statute would not apply to proceedings relating to obtaining or resisting the 
judgment, only to those proceedings relating to collecting on the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Munday should not be allowed to escape his agreement with Safe Home. There is 
no dispute that Munday signed the Confession, promised to work for Safe Home for 3-
years, and took the $160,000 only to quit four-months later. The trial court erred in 
preventing Safe Home from obtaining a judgment against Munday and awarding him his 
attorney fees. The trial court's ruling should be reversed and Munday should be required 
to repay the $160,000 signing bonus. 
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